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Torrents Time bundles certificates and private keys (gist.github.com)
50 points by brie22 on Feb 12, 2016 | hide | past | favorite | 14 comments


The torrents time server is just to allow your local browser to stream the videos that are being downloaded in a way that makes the browser happy and avoids mixed content issues. Why does it matter if the keys are shipped?

They're a workaround that don't improve or reduce security from what I can tell.

Edit: The more egregious parts of the security issues is due to any website being able to access that local server, the server running as root on OSX, etc. THAT is major.


Agreed. Not sure if this was already posted on HN, but here's a write-up about Torrent Time's security issues: http://blog.andrew.im/post/139084882590/torrents-time-securi...


I'm not sure why the author wrote that post, it consists mostly of irrelevant filler material (the only real issue pointed out is the fact that it runs as root on osx).

It shouldn't be that hard to find actual issues in torrent time, but this post is just complaining for the sake of complaining.


Why use proprietary software when there's https://webtorrent.io/

Is piratebay turning into another sourceforge or download.com?


It uses webrtc, that's not compatible with real torrent clients.

And afaik torrents time is not affiliated with TPB, beyond the latter embedding the former.


I strongly dislike the idea of a CA going around revoking certs/keys just because the keys were leaked somewhere.

This road (as wished for by the author) is very dangerous - it reads to me: "If a software(-bug) or human error allows technically skilled personal to gain access to a private key, all connected keys shall be revoked".

This would apply to (possibly) millions of servers with e.g. vulnerable PHP versions or such stuff.

So. Torrents Time made a bad move. Why is that a CA-concern? Honestly, tell me.


Short answer: because the CA/B forum requires this. See "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates, v.1.1.7" section 13.1.5 point 3.

https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/BRv1.1.7.pdf

Long answer:

Certificate authorities provide assurance. In this instance, they received a request from someone asserting "I am localhost.ttconfig.xyz, I have this public key, and I sign this entire statement using my private key". The certificate authorities validated that the requester did in fact control localhost.ttconfig.xyz, then they took the request above, added "I am <Comodo/GeoTrust/thawte>, this certificate reflects the identity and intentions of <subject>, and I sign this entire statement using my private key".

Your browser trusts certificate authorities to make statements like these. This trust is not given blindly; it's instead driven by complex procedural machinery. Browser vendors require certificate authorities to do specific things in order to earn and keep the browser's trust. For example, see Mozilla's CA policies:

https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/secu...

The certificate authorities have rules to follow, and they in turn require that their subscribers do certain things so the CA can comply with those rules. One of the requirements CAs make of their customers is that they protect their private key.

Why is this important? Well, remember that the CA made a statement that "this certificate reflects the identity and intentions of <subject>". Losing your private key means anyone else can use that certificate, even if they are not you – which makes the CA's statement a lie. CAs are built on trust, so they must revoke it.


Thank you for the detailed explanation. I was not aware that there were rules enforcing such actions.

The linked PDF answers the question why corrupted software stacks do not qualify for forced revocation. Section 10.2.4 (which is the lever for 13.1.5) requires (but not limited to that) a private key to be "communicated" to restricted parties before a revocation might be considered.

--> For the small fee of some downvotes i learned that any cloud based service storing private keys for end users qualifies for a revocation - as long as the CA knows about it.


Perhaps this is a dumb question, but what should the torrent time developers have done differently to have local valid TLS without bundling a private key?


They don't really need valid TLS in the first place for localhost.

At least in firefox Mixed content warnings can be bypassed with custom protocols that declare that they're secure for embedding in secure content.


Generating a unique key for each installation and adding that to the list of root CAs on that computer.


Err... Isn't that what Lenovo did with Superfish?

That sounds like terrible advise.


No. Lenovo used the same certificate for every computer, and pre installed the software without user consent.

Generating a new certificate on the computer it's used on is different.


CAs guarantee that their certificates are secure. If they find out that is no longer guaranteed, then the guarantee is broken. Guaranteeing security is... well, why CAs exist.

And breaking vulnerable PHP servers is probably a good idea anyway. Then maybe someone might realize that they're incorrectly configured.




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